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Abstract
Most critical infrastructure depends on industrial control and automation systems to
manage their processes. However, industrial control and automation systems were found
to have many vulnerabilities owing to their design. They were initially designed to operate
as air-gapped systems. However, with the evolution and the expansion of the industry,
they are increasingly being targeted by attackers. Thus, preventative methods must be
implemented to minimize/ prevent ICSs from being compromised by patching the
vulnerabilities and addressing possible attack vectors. In order to prepare to defend
against forthcoming attacks on critical infrastructure, it is vital to understand how past
attacks have been carried out. This study analyzed and cataloged cases of attacks
against ICSs to form a taxonomy that can be used as a tool to analyze the nature of ICS
attacks. The taxonomy developed by this study can aide interested parties to determine
potential attack vectors an attacker may choose, based on the attributes discussed in the
study. Moreover, this paper also serves as a resource for the interested parties to
understand ICSs.
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Chapter I: Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Security of Critical Infrastructure is vital to the wellbeing of a nation. Legacy ICSs
(Industrial Control Systems) such as SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition)
are widely used in Critical Infrastructure due to their robustness and proven performance.
However, the legacy network security solutions such as airgaps and obscurity appear to
be ineffective at shielding these systems from cyber-physical attacks.
The introduction of network protocols such as TCP/IP, GSM and the use of
conventional operating systems and software within SCADA and other ICSs has resulted
in these systems being less secluded from the cyberspace (Kube, 2013). Thus, their
vulnerabilities can be exploited by hackers, terrorists and others will malicious intentions.
For example, during 2016 the Sandworm hackers successfully executed a cyber-physical
attack on the power grid of Ukraine causing a blackout that affected many people (Gavin,
2018).
To minimize ICSs from being compromised an understanding of past attacks are
necessary. Thus, this study discussed past cases of attacks on ICSs and clarified them
by their attributes such as Target Industry, Vulnerabilities, Vector, payloads, attacker and
Motivation. These attributes were organized into a taxonomy which will facilitate the
analysis of these attacks on ICSs with their target industries, target vulnerabilities and
attacker profiles. Moreover, this taxonomy will clearly explain the nature of these attacks
and how they may be carried out in the future.
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1.11 Industrial control Systems
ICS (Industrial control system) refers to the wide array of control systems and
equipment used to electronically manage an industrial process, Figure 1. The most
common types of ICS are SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) and DCS
(Distributed Control System). Also, some of the components that ICSs use are PLCs
(Programmable Logic Controllers), RTUs (Remote Terminal Units) and HMIs (Human
Machine Interfaces).

Figure 1. The layout of an ICS. From Industrial Control System, Courtesy of TREND
MICRO (TREND MICRO, n.d.)
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SCADA and DCS are a combination of software and hardware elements that
provide supervisory control and data acquisition over long distances. The software works
in tandem with equipment such as HMIs, PLCs and RTUs to provide operators with a
centralized control system. The centralized control system controls the field devices such
as valves, motors, and pumps via PLCs and RTUs. The HMIs present the operator with
a display to monitor the process. It also enables the operator to configure setpoints,
adjust control parameters and address alarms.
Prior to the advent of ICS such as SCADA and DCS, most industrial plants
consisted of manual controls and analog systems. Consequently, they required multiple
operators to be on site, where they would monitor gauges and operate manual controls.
The technological advances during and after the mid-1900s enabled the automation of
these plants thus, transferring the manual controls to ICS.
1.2 Problem Statement
ICSs such as SCADA was introduced in the 1960s and relied on air gaps and
obscurity to be insulated from attacks. With the growth of the cyberspace, ICSs that
critical infrastructure rely upon, are increasingly becoming internet facing systems due to
the integration of operational technology (OT) and IT. Hence, they are vulnerable to
attacks. Thus, preventative methods must be implemented to minimize ICSs from being
compromised by patching the vulnerabilities and addressing the possible attack vectors.
In order to prepare to defend against forthcoming attacks against critical infrastructure, it
was vital to understand how these attacks had been carried out. However, tools available
for Interested parties that enable them to easily understand the nature of potential attacks
are limited.
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1.3 Nature and Significance of the Problem
The Natanz nuclear facility in Iran, operates many centrifuges to extract enriched
Uranium to the displeasure of many nations such as Israel and the United States of
America. The facility was facing multiple technical issues during the years of 2009 and
2010.

Their centrifuges were having catastrophic failures and the safety systems

designed to protect the centrifuges were malfunctioning. The engineers working at the
site were unable to locate the root cause until later it was revealed to be the work of a
malware called Stuxnet (also known as Olympic Games), designed specifically to target
the PLCs (programable logic controllers) employed at Iranian nuclear enrichment
facilities.
The attack carried out at Natanz, rumored to be orchestrated by state actors,
revealed the vulnerabilities of SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) and
other ICSs (Industrial Control Systems). The use of ICSs such as SCADA is prolific in
critical infrastructure such as power plants, water treatment facilities, petroleum refining
and chemical processing. Thus, widespread grief including loss of life can be brought
onto to large populations if a successful attack was to target critical infrastructure, since
they have a direct physical impact such as power outages, pipe explosions, malfunctions
in the water and sewage management. It is therefore vital to understand the nature of
past attacks and how they have been carried out against critical infrastructure, in order to
prepare to defend against future attacks.
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A Threat landscape developed by Monyai (2018), Figure 2, illustrates the global
impact of attacks against ICSs.

Figure 2. "Threat landscape for Industrial Automation Systems", (Monyai, 2018)
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Attacks on ICSs have been reported since the turn of the millenia, Figure 3. The
rapid growth of the cyber-space can only mean, an increase in such attacks.

Figure 3. Trend of cyber-attacks on ICS (Cyber Immunity, a holistic view for Industrial
Control Systems, 2017)
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1.4 Objective of the Study
To understand the nature of the attacks on ICSs, to identify the key attributes of
the attacks, to recognize the key vulnerabilities common to most ICSs and to develop a
taxonomy that presents the effects of an attack. Moreover, the goal of this study is to
present a tool that allows to recognize the nature of the past attacks on industrial control
systems and how they may be carried out in the future.
1.5 Study Questions/Hypotheses
1. How to analyze the nature of the attacks on Industrial Control systems?
2. What are the key attributes of the attacks on Industrial Control systems?
3. What vulnerabilities are common to most ICSs?
4. How to forecast the possible attacks on ICS?
1.6 Limitations of the Study
This study will not introduce new solutions to the vulnerabilities that exist in ICSs.
It will be limited to providing the reader with solutions that are already published and
practiced.
1.7 Definition of Terms
PLC: Programable logic controller, is an industrial computer that is used to control
field devices such as valves, motors and pumps. It consists of many I/O (inputs and
outputs) that helps it to transmit and receive simple ON/OFF signals as well as analog
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control signals such as 4-20 mA and 0-10 VDC signals. It is built to be rugged in order to
withstand electrical noise, vibration and large temperature ranges. Moreover, it is capable
of networking either through serial communication protocols such as RS-232 or through
ethernet. Thus, it can communicate with SCADA software via a LAN (local area network).
RTU: A Remote Terminal Unit is very similar to a PLC in function. However, unlike
a PLC, an RTU is designed and built to be extremely rugged and operate in remote areas
and in withstand harsh environments (offshore oil rigs, mountain tops, mining etc.).
HMI: A Human Machine Interface is a programable display device that are
normally touchscreen. It provides the operator with a graphical user interface (GUI), that
facilitates the communication between the operator and control devices in the ICS
environment.
IIOT: IIOT, stands for industrial internet of things. This can be understood as the
result of the natural evolution of operational technology such as PLCs, RTUs and SCADA
systems. The fourth industrial revolution, which we are in the midst of have contributed
significantly to the IIOT development. Self-driving vehicles, highly automated production
facilities and even more efficient renewable energy systems such as smart grids owe their
success to IIOT.
Airgaps: Airgap is a method of assuring the network security by physically
isolating it from external connections such as the internet to prevent unauthorized access.
1.8 Summary
The critical infrastructure that supports the modern lifestyle of many is under threat
from cyberattacks, especially with the escalation of cyberwarfare. The expansion of the
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cyberspace and the integration of conventional IT technologies into ICSs are assumed to
be the main reason behind this.
This study analyzed and cataloged cases of attacks against ICSs to form a
taxonomy that can be used as a tool to analyze the nature of historical ICS attacks. The
taxonomy can aide interested parties to determine potential attack vectors an attacker
may use, based on the attributes discussed in the study. Moreover, this paper also serves
as a resource for the interested parties to understand ICSs.
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Chapter II: Background and Review of Literature
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter various sources of information were used to expand the
understanding of the vulnerabilities in ICSs and potential solutions available. The sources
ranged from articles published in reputed media, vendor websites, research papers and
journals. Different sources presented different aspects of ICSs and their vulnerabilities,
but they were all in tune when discussing the potential impacts of a successful attack.
In addition to sources pertaining to ICSs and their vulnerabilities, the review of
literature also includes sources used to model the data collection and the analysis. This
data was sourced from a wide array of disciplines, as the primary focus was identifying
various methodologies that can be used to conduct this study. Due to the affinity of this
study towards a qualitative approach, sources elaborating qualitative studies were
considered.
2.2 Background Related to the Problem
There were many studies that outline the potential vulnerabilities of ICSs.
However, the studies that map vulnerabilities of ICSs to other attributes were scarce.
Thus, this study aims to provide IT professionals with a classification of security incidents
that expresses the relationship between attacks and their attributes.
The study of attacks on ICSs appeared to gain a significant momentum after the
Stuxnet virus and the damage it caused was disclosed.

Many researchers were

concerned about vulnerability assessments of ICSs. This was due to the realization that
obscurity and isolation are not effective means of protecting such systems.
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A significant contribution to the understanding of the vulnerabilities and how the
ICSs are targeted was provided by cyber security

firms such as Trend Micro and

Kaspersky. However, the data expressed in such sources are directed at an audience
who are expected to be proficient in the area. Hence, many research articles were geared
towards simplifying the information to be used by IT Professionals.
2.3 Literature Related to the Problem
An ICS network security vendor website, Trend Micro, discusses three primary
motivations for an attack, these are financial gain, political cause and military objectives.
Based on the level of motivation and resources at the attacker’s disposal, it may be near
impossible to shield a system from attack as seen in the case of Natanz nuclear
enrichment facility.

At Natanz, the worm created for the attack was extremely

sophisticated with four zero-day vulnerabilities and the ability to seek out and attack very
specific equipment (Karnouskos, 2012).
Trend Micro describes attacks on an ICS as a step-by-step process. Firstly, the
attacker will gather information regarding the target ICS by surveying the environment.
Next, the attacker will attempt to find ways to anchor into the network, after which potential
vulnerabilities in the system would be analyzed. Once these steps are complete, the
attacker will use malware or intrude into the network to cause the desired damage. The
complexity of an attack ranges from simple (denial-of-service attacks) to complex
(manipulating the control systems undetected).
As noted, Stuxnet virus brought attention to the vulnerabilities in critical
infrastructure. The main concern behind the attack was with the nature in which it was
used. Stuxnet was the launch of the first digital weapon and it unveiled a new theater of
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war, cyberwarfare (Zetter, An Unprecendented Look at Stuxnet, the World's First Digital
Weapon, 2014). Zetter (2014) details the order of events that ultimately led to the
detection and the realization of the impacts of the virus.

The article details the

sophistication of the attack that allowed the infiltration to go undetected for an extended
period, all the while attacking components vital to the process.
ICSs such as SCADA are responsible for many industrial processes such as
production, power generation, water management and wind farms (Karnouskos, 2012).
Karnouskos (2012), explains the realization of the vulnerabilities of what was thought of
as systems impervious to cyber-attack was the lasting impact of Stuxnet. The author
emphasizes on the importance of enforcing rules generally used in IT networks such as
timely installation of security patches, better regulated and well defended networks.
These measures are emphasized despite the increase in the overhead and the
continuous maintenance demanded.
Attacks on ICSs have been reported in the past, however, the frequency of attacks
especially on targets like power grids are on the rise, possibly inspired by Stuxnet. A
carefully planned attack that prompts a cascading failure is possible (Che, Liu, Ding, & Li,
2019). A cascading failure occurs when certain parts of the power grid are overloaded,
causing other parts to fail as a result. Generally, such occurrences are rare but cyber
attackers can use a False Data Injection (FDI) attack to initiate them (Che, Liu, Ding, &
Li, 2019). The authors describe and FDI attack as an act of intruding a network and
falsifying the data received by the controllers, causing them to respond incorrectly. The
simulations carried out in the study reveal the risks imposed by attackers targeting the
control systems of the power grid and other critical infrastructure.
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The advancements in technology such as Cloud-based SCADA has unearthed
many advantages. For instance, a petroleum company located in Canada brought more
than 300 wells online within a month by using offsite SCADA (Gavin, 2018). As described
in the article, if the company opted to use onsite SCADA systems, bringing the wells
online would have consumed more time and capital.
With the digitization of ICSs, the number of vulnerabilities and the targets available
for attack has also grown (Gavin, 2018). Gavin (2018), highlights recent attacks such as
the attack on Ukrainian power grid that caused blackouts for more than half a million
people by the Sandworm hackers, the Shamoon virus that affected Saudi Arabian oil
companies and the WannaCry ransomware that not only spread to hospital computer
systems, but also to their equipment such as MRI scanners and blood testing devices.
The author also highlights the fears within the industry that prevents them from
modernizing their systems, and the opportunity cost of it.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has published a guide
to secure ICSs (Stouffer, Pillitteri, Lightman, Abrams, & Hahn, 2015). Based on the guide,
there are many potential avenues an ICS may experience disruptions. These disruptions
can be due to troubles with the information flow, unauthorized manipulation of operational
parameters and equipment, faulty data transmission, malware, neutralizing safety
systems and commanding equipment to operate in self-destructive manner.
Stouffer, Pillitteri, Lightman, Abrams, & Hahn (2015) outlines the importance of
restricting access to the ICS, both physically and logically. Access could be restricted
logically by employing DMZs (Demiliterized Zones), minimizing traffic from the internet
reaching into the ICS network. In addition to these measures, they recommend to take
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measures such as installing safety patches (after testing for compliancy), use antivirus
software and provide users with only the necessary privileges. These measures are
aimed at insulating individual components of the ICS from being exploited.
The possibility of the ICS being compromised is inevitable (Stouffer, Pillitteri,
Lightman, Abrams, & Hahn, 2015). Thus, contingency plans must be in place to recover
the system in the shortest possible time. Moreover, the authors describe the need for
redundancies for all critical components and the elimination of possibilities for cascading
events.
Paridari, et al. (2018) discusses the need of a system-level security methods in
order to protect ICSs. This idea was reached because of the “tight integration between
the controlled physical environment and the cyber system” (Paridari, et al., 2018, p. 114).
The authors also introduce the idea of attack detection (such as man-in-the-middle) by
using data analytics and visualization.
Attacks on ICSs can come from many sources, such as, non-IT /process
automation employees, IT /process automation employees, vendors /contractors and
hackers/ external entities (Theron, 2014).

Theron (2014) identifies the primary

motivations for attacks as wanting to cause damage, tarnishing the reputation, siphoning
data and financial gain. The analysis showed the existance many attack vectors, e.g.
malware, USBs, network and email.
Common attack vectors for targeting a PLC or a SCADA system are man-in-themiddle, DoS, spoofing, packet injection and reconnaissance (Ponomarev & Atkison,
2016). Ponomarev & Atkison (2016) state that most attacks on SCADA systems target
data packets sent to the SCADA system. They would send PLC values into the network
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by falsely identifying themselves as an authorized engineer. Using this method, an
attacker can present the operator with misinformation.
During the past 3-4 decades control system technology had advanced at being
effective at controlling industrial processes (Kube, 2013). However, the security of such
systems has dwindled when considering the threats. The primary reason for this was the
reliance of industrial systems to on air-gaps. The drive to boost the performance of these
systems has resulted in them being tethered to transport protocols such as TCP/IP (Kube,
2013).

This has opened many critical infrastructures to be targets to even some

unsophisticated attacks.
A risk assessment proves whether a cyber-physical system (CPS) can operate
safely (Wu, Kang, & Li, 2015). Wu, Kang and Li (2015) presents a strategy to quantify
the risk of a cyber-attack. In order quantify the risks, the attacks were classified into
“physical availability, cyber availabilty, cyber integrity and cyber confidentiality attacks”
(Wu, Kang, & Li, 2015).
Older ICSs may require patches and careful monitoring until they are phased out.
On the contrary, new ICSs must be designed to circumvent all forecasted threats within
its operational period (Mishina, Takaragi, & Umezawa, 2018). The remedy proposed by
Mishina, Takaragi and Umezawa (2018) was to use a Fault Tree-Attack Tree (FT-AT)
developed using vulnerability databases.
In the paper, “A tiered security analysis of Industrial Control System Devices”,
authors Vargas, Langfinger and Vogel-Heuser (2017) dissects the components of an ICS
and discusses vulnerabilities. The components were separated into hardware layer,
firmware layer, and the programming layer (Vargas, Langfinger, & Vogel-Heuser, 2017).
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This facilitates the recognition and the classification of vulnerabilities. For instance, most
ICSs embed RTOs in their systems to provide the required level of reliability, speed and
ruggedness (Vargas, Langfinger, & Vogel-Heuser, 2017). However, they are much more
vulnerable when compared to typical operating systems used.
The document from the Homeland Security’s Control Systems Security Program
in the National Cyber Security Division explicitly states: “The strength, growth, and
prosperity of this nation are maintained by key resources and a functioning and healthy
infrastructure. Much of that infrastructure is sustained by a variety of industrial control
systems.” (Homeland Security, 2009). Homeland Security emphasizes the importance of
enhancing the cyber incident response. This is because, and incident may cause data
breaches or a compromised web site touting content to embarrass an organization
shifting the public concern. However, a more serious attack that may have physical
consequences such as changing the chemical composition of the water supply or a
release of untreated sewage would instill a severe distrust on the organization that may
take a long time to forget (Homeland Security, 2009).
Having a calculated and coordinated response to ICS attacks allows for a rapid
deployment of preventative methods (Homeland Security, 2009).

For this purpose,

Homeland Security had put forth multiple automated approaches.

These include

Networks Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS), Protocol-based Intrusion Detection
System (PIDS), Host-based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS), Intrusion Prevention
System (IPS), Network and Device Logging and the Configuration of Data Generators
(Homeland Security, 2009).
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2.4 Literature Related to the Methodology
Many studies have been conducted using a variety of methodologies to study the
vulnerabilities and how they compromise ICSs. As noted, only a handful of these studies
propose solutions to eliminate or mitigate the effects of these vulnerabilities. Upadhyay
& Sampalli (2019), provided a table (Table 1) listing vulnerabilities of SCADA software
along with recommendations to mitigate them.
Table 1
Courtesy of (Upadhyay & Sampalli, 2019)
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Kim, Heo, Zio, Shin, & Song, (2019), conducted a similar study for cyber attacks
on the digital environment in nuclear power plants. They have developed a taxonomy for
cyber-attacks on nuclear power plants where they used classifications such as attack
procedure, attack vector, attack concequence, vulnerability and countermeasures. The
attack procedure was further branched into “gathering information, acquiring access
rights, command and control, and action and exfiltration” (Che, Liu, Ding, & Li, 2019).
Furthermore, they subdivided the attack vector “into physical access and network access”
(Che, Liu, Ding, & Li, 2019). Finally, the consquences were subdivided into two subcatogories and they were sabotach and unauthorized removal of nuclear material.
Qualitative studies are most suited for understanding the nature of attacks against
ICSs. Qualitative researches are conducted to “understand, explain, explore, discover,
and clarify situations, feelings, perceptions, attitudes, values, believes and experiences”,
(Kumar, 2011). Owing to this reason, study designs constructed qualitatively employ
deductive logic instead of inductive logic. Moreover, these study designs are agile, nonlinear and unorganized in their implementation (Kumar, 2011).
Qualitative research allows the researcher dive deep into acumens on vague
topics. This is possible because, qualitative research is expressed in words. Thus, it
enables the understanding of “concepts, thoughts or experiences”, (Streefkerk, 2019).
Studies that require the investigation of specific attributes and consequences find case
study to be a suitable research design. This is because, case studies allow the researcher
to probe real world subjects and obtain a thorough “concrete, contextual and in depth
knowledge”, (McCombes, How to do survey research, 2019). Furthermore, “if a study
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contains more than a single case then a multiple-case study is required”, (Baxter & Jack,
2008). This is comparable to a study with multiple experiments.
According to Church (2002), data collected indirectly by means of the work
conducted by other researches are known as secondary data. Russell states, “secondary
data analysis may be based on the published data or it may be based on the original
data”, (Church, 2002). Moreover, Streefkerk (2019) explains that the use of secondary
data allows for a holistic view of the topic.
Non-probability sampling methods suite researches that are conducted to develop
a preliminary understanding of a small population (McCombes, Understanding different
sampling methods, 2019). This is because, such studies are focused on exploring and
expanding the topics rather than testing a specific hypothesis for a large population
(McCombes, Understanding different sampling methods, 2019). Moreover, according to
Setia (2016) and McCombes (2019), a non-probability sampling study allows the
researcher to simply include the data that are most accessible. Hence, such studies
cannot produce generalized results (McCombes, Understanding different sampling
methods, 2019).
The objective of a qualitative content analysis is to provide solutions to the
research questions. Thus, a qualitative content analysis allows the researcher to be
selective of the data (Hashemnezhad, 2015). Hsieh and Shannon (2005) list three distinct
approaches to content analysis, they are “conventional, directed or summative”, (Hsieh &
Shannon, 2005). Although these are three distinct approaches, they all “adhere to the
naturalistic paradigm”, (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) because the text data were used to
interpret meaning. Moreover, Hsieh and Shannon (2005) defined qualitative content
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analysis as “a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data
through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or
patterns”, (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).
Joshi, Singh and Tarey (2015) explains that a taxonomy is a useful tool when
“performing a systematic security assessment of a system”, (Joshi, Singh, & Tarey, 2015).
Maria Kjaerland from the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Stavanger, Norway has
developed a taxonomy that is limited to cyber intrusions. The aspects for the taxonomy
based on CERT/CC were “Source sectors, Method of Operation, Impact, Target Sectors”,
(Kjaerland, 2006). These aspects were comparable to “Attackers, Tools, Access, and
Results” developed by Maria.
In the article “A taxonomy of network and computer attacks”, by Hansman and
Hunt (2005), a taxonomy was made and the correlations between the dimensions were
made. For instance, a correlation between an attack and a vulnerability may reveal
seemingly unrelated attacks may share common dimensions (Hansman & Hunt, 2005).
This can then open new paths of research.
2.5 Summary
The literature reviews contained in this chapter describes similar studies
conducted in the past. The studies provide a broader understanding of the vulnerabilities
within ICSs and how attackers target them. The studies also provide a foundation to the
method described in the following chapter. The literature review in this chapter was
extensively used to frame the methodology that was used to collect and analyze data
pertaining to past ICS security compromise incidents.
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Chapter III: Methodology
3.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the methodology of the study. The study was a qualitative
multi-case study employing a non-probability convenience sampling technique to select
data samples for the study. Secondary qualitative descriptive data was collected through
literature reviews and case studies that were published in news articles, cybersecurity
case studies, and prior research papers. Gathered data were analyzed through content
conventional analysis from which a taxonomy was developed to present the results of the
study.
3.2 Design of the Study
By nature, this study is a qualitative study. Therefore, the study used a qualitative
approach based on three considerations. These three considerations were the study
being: expressed in words, used to understand concepts and experiences and gathering
in-depth insights on topics. The flexibility of the qualitative study approach allowed the
study to be flexible throughout the study.
Qualitative data collects information that seeks to describe a topic more than
measure it. Think of impressions, opinions, and views. A qualitative survey is less
structured: It seeks to delve deep into the topic at hand to gain information about
people’s motivations, thinking, and attitudes. While this brings depth of
understanding to your research questions, it also makes the results harder to
analyze (Survey Moneky, n.d.).
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“Qualitative research is expressed in words. It is used to understand concepts,
thoughts or experiences. This type of research enables you to gather in-depth insights on
topics that are not well understood.” (Streefkerk, 2019)
Qualitative research methods start from questions which tend to be more “open”
and additional ideas for data collection can emerge during the data collection
phase. Data can be gathered using a range of methods, including interviews, focus
groups, or observations. Analysis of these data tends to be text-based (Boeren,
2018).
“The ‘power-gap’ between the researcher and the study population in qualitative
research is far smaller than in quantitative research because of the informality in structure
and situation in which data is collected.” (Kumar, 2011) “Because of flexibility and lack of
control it is more difficult to check researcher bias in qualitative studies.” (Kumar, 2011)
Based on the characteristics established by the researcher of this study, attacks
on ICSs from 2003 to 2017 with a physical aspect was constituted as the study population
of this study. “A complete set of elements (persons or objects) that possess some
common characteristic defined by the sampling criteria established by the researcher”
(Populations and Sampling, n.d.).
Secondary data type was used in this study for data collection. The secondary
data type was selected because it was easier and faster to access, larger and more
diverse, flexible and conductible with small samples, and can be gathered from the study
subject without intervening.
Due to the qualitative nature of the study, multi-case study approach was used as
the study design. “Case study design is a very useful design when exploring an area
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where little is known or where you want to have a holistic understanding of the situation.”
(Kumar, 2011) “Case study design is of immense relevance when the focus of a study is
on extensively exploring and understanding rather than confirming and quantifying. It
provides an overview and in-depth understanding of a case(s).” (Kumar, 2011)
In this Case study design [our] attempt is not to select a random sample but a case
that can provide you with as much information as possible to understand the case
in its totality. When studying an episode or an instance, [our] attempt to gather
information from all available sources so as to understand it in its entirety (Kumar,
2011).
“If a study contains more than a single case then a multiple-case study is required.”
(Baxter & Jack, 2008).

Thus, the study had successfully adopted the multi-case.

Nonprobability convenience sampling technique had to be used to determine the target
sample of this study because the number of elements in the population was unknown
and the data was gathered through the most accessible cases. Also, it was an easy and
inexpensive way to gather the initial data. “non-probability sampling methods where the
sample population is selected in a non-systematic process that does not guarantee equal
chances for each subject in the target population.“ (Elfil & Negida, 2017)
10 cases of attacks on ICSs between 2003 and 2017 were selected as the sample
size for this study. This sample was chosen because it was deemed to be the most
representatives of the target population. In this study the number of related cases were
decided in advance. However, the available data was collected until the data saturation
point was reached.
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“In qualitative research, you do not have a sample size in mind. Data collection
based upon a predetermined sample size and the saturation point distinguishes their use
in quantitative and qualitative research.” (Kumar, 2011) “In a non-probability sample,
individuals are selected based on non-random criteria, and not every individual has a
chance of being included. This type of sample is easier and cheaper to access.”
(McCombes, Understanding different sampling methods, 2019) “Convenience sampling
(also known as availability sampling) is a specific type of non-probability sampling method
that relies on data collection from population members who are conveniently available to
participate in study.” (Dudovskiy, n.d.)
3.3 Data Collection
Data for this study were sourced from the websites of cybersecurity firms, news
articles, online magazines, scholarly articles and case studies. The articles were then
vetted for credibility, relevance (presence of physical harm) and for the available content.
The selection of secondary data for this study expanded the scope of the study and it was
cost and time efficient.
There were no limits set on the number of ICS attacks considered for this study.
However, based on the convenience sampling technique data were derived from ICS
attacks that happened from 2003 to 2017.
3.4 Data Analysis
The textual data compiled from literature reviews, news media, case-studies,
research papers and cybersecurity publications were analyzed to derive the attribute data
from the attacks. The material compiled from these sources were analyzed using content
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analysis. The derived attribute data was then organized into categories also known as
dimensions.
By using the Content analysis method, [the study] [was] able to analyze the data
without the direct involvement of participants, so our presence as a researcher
doesn’t influence the results. Also, [the study] [was] able to followed a systematic
procedure that could easily be replicated by other researchers, and produced
results with high reliability. Due to the high flexibility of this method [the study] could
conduct [the] data analysis at any time & in any location at low cost by accessed
to the appropriate sources (Luo, 2019).
There are three types of content analysis, and they are; conventional content
analysis, directed content analysis and summative content analysis. This study began
with observation and the codes derived from data were defined during the data analysis.
Therefore, a conventional content analysis was employed.
“In conventional content analysis, coding categories are derived directly from the
text data.With a directed approach, analysis starts with a theory or relevant research
findings as guid-ance for initial codes.” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005)
The data analysis was followed using the steps in Figure 4.
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Data at the source was continually read in a general manner to obtain a holistic sense of the idea and to be
engaged.

The data was cautiously examined word-by-word as it was read again. Key words that capture crucial concepts
were highlighted.

Notes were made to contextualize the main impressions and thoughts in order develop codes.

Labels for the codes were established to reflect the data it examines.

Codes were then clustered into categories based on their correlations.
This study used 7 such categories.

A taxonomy was developed.
This taxonomy was based on the four dimension taxonomy developed by Hansman and Hunt (2005).

Figure 4. Steps for data analysis
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3.5 Summary
This chapter described the methodology employed to collect and analyze the data
obtained for selected 10 number of cases of attacks on ICSs from 2003 to 217. The
methodology used, was a qualitative multi-case study and it employed a non-probability
convenience sampling technique to select data sample from the population for the study.
This methodology used employed a conventional content analysis on the secondary
qualitative descriptive data collected through literature reviews and case studies that were
published in news articles, cybersecurity case studies, and prior research papers.
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Chapter IV: Data Presentation and Analysis
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the 10 cases considered for the study as the sample of
study. Each case was introduced and explained utilizing the secondary data sourced
from news articles, research papers, cybersecurity firms and case studies. The data
presented and the subsequent analysis was detailed in this chapter.
4.2 Data Presentation
4.2.1 Saudi Arabian Petrochemical Plant Attacked, 2017
Triton is a rare caliber of malware because its creators had the intention of
targeting safety systems of their victims. These safety systems are the last line of defense
against serious accidents. Safety systems actively monitor, warn and act against any
impending accidents. Therefore, malfunctions in these systems can compromise the
safety of the facility as well as its employees and nearby residents (Giles, 2019). For
example, in 1984, the leak of highly toxic Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) from the Union Carbide
India Limited (UCIL) in Bhopal, India killed 3,787 victims.
The malware, Triton, discovered in a Saudi Arabian petrochemical plant, if
deployed without bugs, would allow the attacker to take control over the plant’s safety
systems (Giles, 2019). Triton targets a vulnerability (this vulnerability has since been
patched) in the Triconex safety controllers that were offered by Schneider Electric (Giles,
2019). Triconex safety systems are widely used in the industry and they can be found in
safety applications ranging from water treatment facilities to nuclear power plants (Giles,
2019).
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A bug in the cyberweapon caused two shutdowns of the petrochemical plant. The
initial outage was thought to be due to a mechanical glitch, however, due to a second
shutdown, industrial cybersecurity specialists from FireEye and Dragos were dispatched
to investigate before the plant was brought online again. The investigation revealed the
attackers had been able to infiltrate the company’s corporate IT network since 2014.
The investigators speculate, a poorly configured firewall may have allowed the
hackers to access the plant’s network. Moreover, an unpatched windows vulnerability or
by intercepting a worker’s login credentials would have gotten them access to an
engineering workstation with a communication link to the safety systems used at the plant.
The hackers having access to the engineering workstation learned about the safety
layout of the facility. This revealed to them, the use of the Triconex safety controller.
Thus, they most likely acquired a controller of their own and probed it for its vulnerabilities
and communication protocols.

This would have presented them with the zero-day-

vulnerability in the controller that would have given them full control of the safety system.
The hackers of this attack were unquestionably targeting the specific sites the
malware was found. Thus, this attack was a highly sophisticated one, and may have the
involvement of nation states. Giles (2019), compares this attack to the Stuxnet attack, in
terms of the commitment from the hackers and their capability. However, Giles (2019)
distinguishes this cyberweapon from the one used at Natanz nuclear enrichment facility
due the moral inaptness of the Saudi Arabian petrochemical plant hackers in their blatant
disregard for human life.
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4.2.2 Ukraine Power Grid, 2016
The attack on the Ukrainian power grid during the month of December in 2016 was
the second such attack on Ukraine’s power grid. The target of the attack was a substation
north of Kiev, and it triggered a blackout that lasted for about an hour (Greenberg, 2017).
The attack was well-coordinated and carried over some DNA from the 2015 attack e.g.
the telephone denial-of-service (TDoS) for the call centers was repeated in this attack
(Hemsley & Fisher, 2018).
Two cybersecurity firms ESET and Dragos Inc. were dispatched to analyze the
attack. Based on their findings, this was the second case where a malware was written
to target a specific hardware component (Greenberg, 2017).

The malware, “Crash

Override”, or also known as “Industroyer” was found to be modular and be adapted to a
range of attacks against electricity utilities (Greenberg, 2017).
Unlike the previous attack, this attack was fully automated (Greenberg, 2017).
This can therefore be a force multiplier for the attackers. The Crash Override malware
was able to find and communicate with grid equipment using obscure protocols. Thus,
once the malware was deployed, probably using phishing attacks, the malware can
command grid equipment to turn on or off without significant human intervention. This
means, attacks can be planned out quickly and with smaller teams.
Based on ESET’s analysis, the malware can cause physical damage to power
equipment. In the case of this specific attack, the malware seemingly sought after a
vulnerability in a Siemens hardware named Siprotec digital relay (Greenberg, 2017). The
device was designed to open circuit breakers if power levels exceed certain limits.
However, if the device receives a specific string of data, it disables itself until it is
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physically rebooted, thus, causing major issues. Manipulating these breakers would allow
the attackers to cause significant damage to power lines, transformers and other grid
components. These damages would ultimately extend blackout periods.
The attackers can also orchestrate a cascading outage using this type of attack.
This is because multiple points can be attacked simultaneously in a choreographed
manner. This will cause multiple regions to face blackouts at the same time making it
difficult for administrators to handle the issue (Greenberg, 2017).

39
4.2.3 Kemuri Water Company, 2016
Kemuri Water Company (KWC), is a fictional designation given to a water utility by
Verizon Security solutions. The water utility company experienced an attack on its ICS/
SCADA by a Syrian hacktivist group.

The attackers were able to manipulate the

chemicals added to the water supply by gaining control of the PLCs used (Hemsley &
Fisher, 2018). They were reportedly accomplished this by employing low level technics
such as and SQL injection (Leyden, 2016).
KWC was home to many vulnerabilities (Brocklehurst, 2017). Firstly, the internet
payment application webserver used a single factor authentication. Secondly, it was
directly connected to the AS400 server. Thirdly, the AS400 server’s IP address was listed
in the application server in simple text format. However, the most dangerous network
decision that was made was having KWC’s OT network directly tethered to the AS400
server.
The single administrator responsible for the AS400 server lacked any oversight.
This allowed the malpractices such as using same login credentials by the administrator
for the remote access of the AS400 and payment application webserver go unnoticed.
Thus, allowing the threat actors easy paths to infiltrate.
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Figure 5: Poor network framework of Kemuri water company (Verizon, 2016)
The “hacktivist” group stole 2.5 million unique records, but they were interested in
causing public harm by adjusting chemical level and flow rates (Brocklehurst, 2017). The
hacktivists happened to have a limited knowledge of the ICS/SCADA. Hence, KWC was
able to adjust the chemical levels and flow rates back to what it should be (Verizon, 2016).
4.2.4 Ukraine Power Grid, 2015
The first known example of interrupting the functionality of a power grid occurred
at Ukraine during the December of 2015. The logistical sophistication of the attack was
very high, because unlike the attack later in 2016, this attack was driven manually. Also,
the attack was against a hardened target, with many safety precautions.
The result of the attack impacted more than 230,000 residents, and they were
without power for more than 6 hours during winter. This attack was speculated to be
sponsored by a nation state, motivated by political retaliation.
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The hackers used spear-phishing to gain access to the cooperate network. They
sent Microsoft Word files with a Trojan (BlackEnergy3), that gets activated when the
unwitting user authorizes the Word files to run macros. They were unable to navigate to
the SCADA networks directly from the cooperate network due to the presence of firewalls.
Thus, they hijacked VPNs to access the SCADA network remotely.
The attackers strategized the attack after learning about various components of
the ICS used by the power distributor. Leading to the attack, the uninterruptible power
supplies (UPSs) used at the site were disabled. Additionally, malicious software was
written to overwrite the firmware of the serial-to-ethernet convertors. This was to prevent
the power company from remotely accessing them to close the breakers again. Finally,
they injected a logic bomb with a payload (KillDisk) to cover their tracks. This would
overwrite the data in important system files causing the computers crash and unable to
boot again.
At 3:30 PM on December 23rd, 2015, the attack was executed. The plan was
executed flawlessly, and as an added measure, they triggered a TDoS attack right before
bringing down the power. This would prevent the customers from phoning into report the
outage. The outage lasted up to 6 hours and the breakers that were remotely opened by
the attackers had to be manually closed because of the damage done to their serial-toethernet convertors. However, their plan exfil without a trace failed because the firewall
and system logs accrued allowed the security experts in Ukraine and the United States
of America reconstruct the attack (Zetter, Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of
Ukraine's Power Grid, 2016).
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4.2.5 German Steel Plant Attack, 2014
An undisclosed German steel plant suffered a major cyber-attack based on a
report published by the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), (Tend
Micro, 2015). The attack was described as an advanced persistent threat (APT) attack
(Lee, Assante, & Conway, 2014). Based on the report, the plant’s furnace was physically
damaged after plant controls failed.
The information provided by BSI, indicates the attackers to have used spearphishing to get into the corporate network. However, information describing their intrusion
into the OT/ ICS is unavailable.

Nevertheless, they were able to infiltrate the ICS

demonstrating their expertise with ICSs. Once, they were there, they were able to cause
significant damage, specifics of which are not disclosed.
4.2.6 Bowman Avenue Dam, 2013
Bowman avenue dam is a small dam located in New York. In 2013, Iranian
hackers gained unauthorized access to the SCADA systems of the dam which allowed
them to have visibility of sensor data such as water levels and temperatures. They would
have also been able to control the flood gates and cause flooding. However, it is noted
that at the time of attack this would not have been possible due the sluice gate being
under repair and hence offline (Berger, 2016).
One of the attackers identified, Hamid Firoozi, had apparently used an
unsophisticated method, namely, “Google Dorking” to identify the vulnerability (Nation-E,
2016).

He then implemented more advanced maneuvers and technologies to

successfully intrude. This attack highlights the importance of eliminating a lax attitude
towards network security. Moreover, such dams and infrastructures are dotted all around
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the United States, and thus, a consorted effort at targeting such soft targets may lead to
substantial damages to the economy. Hence, all ICSs that have a path to the internet
must practice a high level of network security.
4.2.7 Honeypot, 2013
Honeypot is a cybersecurity tool that is used to collect data on attackers. They are
commonly implemented by cybersecurity vendors.

Honeypots entice attackers by

emulating internet facing ICSs and SCADA systems. They often present attackers with
vulnerabilities and observe the attack vectors hackers use.

The data gathered by

honeypots allow researches and cybersecurity specialists to learn about the threat
landscape and implement preventative methods.
Trend Micro is a major cybersecurity firm that conduct such tests. They use high
interaction honeypots to mimic physical ICS devices like PLCs and low interaction
honeypots to mimic production systems (Wilhoit, 2013). These honeypots were then
deployed strategically around the world. For the 2013 honeypot study, the honeypots
were set to operate separately, hence, no communications were established within one
another. Moreover, the honeypots were made to appear local using language and local
customs.
As a precursor to most attacks, hackers performed recon on the honeypots using
ShodanHQ. They also use text sharing platforms Pastebin and Pastie. Attackers while
masking their IP address using software and services akin to Tor, would scan the netblock
and the ports of the subnets surrounding the target. Moreover, to identify potential
vulnerabilities, they try to determine OSs using fingerprinting and exfiltrate data such as
Virtual Private Network (VPN) configuration files.
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The study did not consider superficial attacks such as SQL injections as “attacks”.
Trend Micro was primarily interested in targeted attacks. Based on their definition of
attacks, 74 attacks from 16 countries were logged on 7 of their honeypots. Of these 11
were considered critical as they had the potential of causing catastrophic failure of the
ICS device.
The definition of critical attacks here would not include DDoS attacks. The attacks
that were deemed critical included Modbus traffic modification, water pump CPU fan
speed modification and setpoint modification. An example of an attack on a honeypot
located at Japan is illustrated in Figure 6.
ShodanHQ
"SCADA country: Japan"

Port Scan, first 1024 ports scanned, when the Modbus port 502 was found, all 65,535
ports were fast scanned

Access HMI, used default user name and password combinations

Attempt to modify Modbus traffic and gain access to Windows Server 2003
"Unsuccessful"

Changed Setpoints and schduled pump shutdown task

Figure 6. Sample honeypot attack
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4.2.8 Attack on Natanz Nuclear Enrichment Facility, 2010
The attack on Natanz nuclear enrichment facility in Iran with the cyberweapon
Stuxnet was the first of its kind. It was one of the most daring and sophisticated attacks
accomplished. The attack blurred the boundaries of the cyber domain of warfare as it
introduced a new element, “sabotage” into this domain. Up until that point, cyber domain
of warfare consisted of espionage, propaganda and economic disruption.
Stuxnet provided the blueprint and the inspiration for a whole range of malware
e.g. Duqu (2011), Flame (2012), Havex (2013), Industroyer (2016) and Triton (2017)
(McAfee, n.d.). These malwares, or also known as cyberweapons, follow the same suite
as Stuxnet. They were most likely sponsored by nation states and executes their tasks
with surgical precision.
Stuxnet was rumored to be in use, even before the centrifuges at Natanz spun into
their destruction. It would have depended on a rogue employee at the facility in order to
jump the air gap for most of its life. However, significant modifications to the malware
code, such as including four zero-day vulnerabilities, allowed the weapon to find its way
into the facility by infecting the computers of contractors that service the facility.
The payload of the malware sought after a specific model of a PLC manufactured
by Siemens. Meanwhile, the worm would appear to lay dormant, all the while it logged
communications between the PLC and the SCADA system. If the PLC was connected to
specific drives that were commanded to spin at a certain frequency. Then, Stuxnet would
overwrite the programs and cause the centrifuges to damage themselves. Meanwhile,
Stuxnet would replay logged data to the SCADA systems keeping operators blind to the
destruction happening to the centrifuges (Fruhlinger, 2017).
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4.2.9 LA Traffic Light Hack, 2006
Films are often credited with being predictors of the future. Fictional action scenes
in films such as “Live Free or Die Hard” and “The Italian Job”, have made us spectators
to possibilities of cyber-attacks when unleashed in a physical arena (Aaronson, 2014).
The LA traffic light hacking incident on 2006 may prove the reality is not far from fiction.
Two traffic engineers from Los Angeles made the fiction a fact on 2006, when they
decided to hack the city’s traffic control system. The two engineers, Kartik Patel and
Gabriel Murillo accessed the system remotely and modified the light sequences in four
intersections of the city. Their actions were akin to a hacktivist as they had acted in
support of a labor union protest, and it ultimately resulted in a severe traffic jam that went
on for multiple days.
The traffic engineers most likely had classified knowledge on how they could
access the traffic light control system remotely. However, this attack clearly illustrates
the vulnerabilities created by bringing infrastructure such as traffic lights online. Few
years later, it was reported that a security expert was able to hack into the New York’s
traffic control system by just using $100 hardware hitting the issue home (Aaronson,
2014).
4.2.10 Davis-Besse Nuclear Plant, 2003
In the January of 2003, Davis-Besse Nuclear Plant located in Ohio experienced an
infection by the worm named Slammer that was designed to attack MS-SQL. The worm
successfully penetrated the private-computer network (Poulsen, 2003).

This

incapacitated the safety monitoring system known as the Safety Parameter Display
System (SPDS), for almost five hours.
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The SPDS provides indicators for coolant systems, core temperatures and external
radiation sensors. Having an SPDS failure was more concerning at the time of the
incident because a large hole in the reactor head was discovered along with other
significant safety issues, leading to an extended shutdown (March 2002 – March 2004).
Had the safety concerns were not found, and the plant continued its operations. The
SPDS system would have been one of the last lines of defense in communicating any
anomalies to the operators.
The worm found its way into the nuclear plant complex by means of a contractor’s
network. The cooperate network of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant had an active
firewall (Poulsen, 2003) but a T1 line from the contractor’s unsecured network bypassed
the firewall. In addition to this T1 line, investigators had found many other entry points
into the plant bypassing the firewall.
The worm was able then spread to the plant network via the previously infected
cooperate network. Due to the extreme use of the CPU power and network bandwidth
by the worm, it crashed the Safety Parameter Display System (Holloway, 2015). Thus,
causing the plant operators to rely on unaffected analog systems for almost five hours.
Nuclear power plants had since been enhanced security wise. Many plants have
implemented stringent security measures and the likelihood of a stray worm or a virus
entering mission critical systems at a nuclear power plant is next to impossible.
4.3 Data Analysis
Following the initial scanning of the content and the word-by-word conventional
content analysis of the data sources, yielded the codes; victim, attack vector, attack tools,
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target, payload, vulnerable hardware, attack identified, physical impact, initial response,
vulnerabilities found, attacker profile, motivation and attack inception.

Figure 7. Coding method

Two examples, the case of the Saudi Arabian Petrochemical Plant, and the
Ukrainian Power Grid Attack 2 are provided below, in order to demonstrate how the codes
were generated.
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Table 2
Coding of the Saudi Arabian petrochemical plant incdent
Content
Petrochemical Plant
Malware
Triton
Safety Systems
Triconex by Schneider electric
2014, Coorporate IT network
2017
Plant shutdown due to safety malfunction caused by attackers gaining control of the safety system
Mechanical glitch assumed
Poorly configured firewall
Unpatched windows vulnerability
Potential interceptability of employee login credentials
Sustained communication link between the work station and the safety system
Zero-day-vulnerability in Triconex
Targeted attacks
High sophistication
High commitment
Non-resource constrained
Disregard to human life

Code
Victim
Attack Vector
Attack tool
Target
Vulnerable Hardware
Attack inception
Attack identified
Physical impact
Initial response
Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities
Attacker profile
Attacker profile
Attacker profile
Attacker profile
Attacker profile

Table 3
Coding of the Ukrainian Power Grid Attack 2
Content
Power distributor
Utility
Malware
Phishing
Crashoverride
Industroyer
Remotely operated breaker switch
Siprotec digital relay by Siemens
2016
2016
Power blackout due to attackers taking control of the breaker switch
Cyber attack assumed
Power restoration through manual swithching
Susceptatbility to phishing attacks
Network allowing the unauthorized communication with critical components
Targeted attacks
Highly sophisticated
High coordination
Non-resource constrained
Innovative

Code
Victim
Victim
Attack Vector
Attack Vector
Attack tool
Attack tool
Target
Vulnerable Hardware
Attack Inception
Attack Identified
Physical Impact
Initial response
Initial response
Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities
Attacker profile
Attacker profile
Attacker profile
Attacker profile
Attacker profile
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After generating codes for all cases as shown above, the common codes that were
found between most cases were categorized into the following seven groups: These
seven groups were considered as the attributes of the attacks on ICSs.
Table 4
Code grouping

Group
Attack Description
Target Industry
Vulnerability
Nature of The Attack
Payload and The Physical Impact
Attacker Profile
Motivation

Code
Attack Identified, Victim
Target
Vulnerabilities found, Vulnerable hardware
Attack tools, Attack vector
Payload, Physical impact
Attacker profile
Motivation

Based on the groups a six-dimension taxonomy was developed, where the attack
description was not considered to be a dimension. The attack description will be used for
attack identification only.
The six dimensions that were used to base the taxonomy are expressed in the
Table 5.
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Table 5.
Six dimensions of the taxonomy

The six-dimension taxonomy developed based on the six attributes of attacks on
ICSs as below.
Table 6
The derived taxonomy model

Attack Description
Year

Title

Attributes of Attacks on ICS
Nature of The
Vulnerability
Payload and
Target
Attack
The Physical
Industry Vulnerability
Attack
Attack
Description
Impact
type
Vector
Tool

Attacker
Profile

Motivation
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4.4 Summary
The data was analyzed using a conventional content analysis technique. This
yielded codes that were clustered into seven groups, and these groups were considered
as the attributes for the ICSs attacks. The seven attributes were used to develop a
taxonomy which can be used as a tool to analyze the nature of historical ICS attacks.
Of the seven attributes six were considered as dimensions and the remaining attribute
was used as the attack identifier.
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Chapter V: Results, Conclusion, and Recommendations
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the study results of the data analysis of selected sample 10
cases of attacks on ICS from 2003 to 2017. A taxonomy was developed to present the
analyzed data on the study. The attributes derived from the attacks on the ICSs were
represent the 6-dimension of the taxonomy.
5.2 Results
The methodology used in the study was a qualitative multi-case study and
employed a non-probability convenience sampling technique to select data samples for
the study. This methodology used employed a conventional content analysis on the
secondary qualitative descriptive data collected through literature reviews and case
studies that were published in news articles, cybersecurity case studies, and prior
research papers.
The data was analyzed using a conventional content analysis technique. This
yielded codes that were clustered into seven groups, and these groups were considered
as the attributes for the ICSs attacks. The seven attributes were used to develop a
taxonomy which can be used as a tool to analyze the nature of historical ICS attacks. Of
the seven attributes six were considered as dimensions and the remaining attribute was
used as the attack identifier. The resulting taxonomy from this study is illustrated in the
Table 7 (Attacker profile, vulnerability and attack vector are elaborated in the appendix).
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Table 7
The taxonomy of ICS attacks incident analysis
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Based the results of the study the study questions have been successfully
answered as follows:
1. How to analyze the nature of the attacks on Industrial Control systems?
This study presents six attributes to analyze the nature of attacks on Industrial
Control Systems. By using the taxonomy presented in this study, interested parties
can clearly understand the nature of those attacks and how they may be carried out
in the future.
2. What are the key attributes of the attacks on Industrial Control systems?
I.

Target industry

II.

Vulnerability type

III.

Nature of the attack (attack vector and attack tool)

IV.

Payload and the physical impact

V.

Attacker profile

VI.

Motivation

3. What vulnerabilities are common to most ICSs?
Vulnerabilities common to most ICSs are vulnerabilities in implementation,
configuration and design.
4. How to forecast the possible attacks on ICS?
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Using the proposed taxonomy in this study as a tool, interested parties can
identify the vulnerabilities of a specific ICS and predict the most common types of
attacks carried out against such vulnerabilities.
5.3 Conclusion
The use of ICSs such as SCADA is prolific in critical infrastructure such as power
plants, water treatment facilities, petroleum refining and chemical processing. With the
growth of the cyberspace, ICSs that critical infrastructure rely upon, are increasingly
becoming internet facing systems (IIOT). Hence, they are vulnerable to cyber-physical
attacks and these vulnerabilities heighten the risk of disruptions and safety concerns to
the society.
Widespread grief including loss of life can be brought onto to large populations if
a successful attack was to target critical infrastructure, since they have a direct physical
impact such as power outages, pipe explosions, malfunctions in the water and sewage
management. To minimize/ prevent ICSs from being compromised an understanding of
past attacks are necessary.

Thus, this study’s primary objective is to address this

necessity.
This study discussed past cases of attacks on ICSs and clarified them by their
attributes. In order to accomplish this study, a qualitative multi-case study was employed.
Attacks on ICSs from 2003 to 2017 were selected as the population for this study. 10
cases have been selected from the population as the sample for this study by nonprobability convenience sampling technique. Data were collected from literature reviews,
case studies, past research etc. and by using conventional content analysis the data were
analyzed and through that six attributes from attacks on ICSs were derived. Based on
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those attributes the study presented a six-dimension taxonomy that can be used as a tool
to analyze the nature of historical ICS attacks and forecast characteristics of future
attacks.
5.4 Recommendations
Based on the study, the following recommendations were made:
•

Security patches must be piloted and installed in ICSs when every they
become available. If the security patch is incompatible with the ICS, then
an understanding of the vulnerability must be developed, and heightened
safety measures must be implemented until a suitable patch becomes
available.

•

Any development in an ICS environment that is out of the ordinary must be
treated as an attack and remedial measures must be implemented.

•

Network architecture must mask OT systems from the internet, and all
communication must be managed through firewalls, managed switches and
protocols.

•

Tunnels such as VPNs must be disabled when not in use, and onsite control
systems must always be preferred despite cost premiums.

5.5 Contributions of the study
The primary contribution of this study is the taxonomy developed to aide interested
parties with the understanding of various types of attacks on industrial control systems
used in critical infrastructure. The summary of attacks in the recent past that are included
in the taxonomy will provide the reader with a good understanding on how the attack was
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carried out, how the victim was selected, the motivations behind the attacks and the tools
used or developed for these attacks.
This paper is also written to serve as a starting point for researchers who are
interested in industrial control systems and their vulnerabilities. This is because, this
paper has sourced and summarized a wealth of information from a diverse set of sources.
These sources range from articles published by cyber security experts such as Kaspersky
and Trend Micro to journalistic articles published such those in the Wired magazine.
5.6 Future Work
The taxonomy developed can be further expanded with additional dimensions and
data.
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Appendix A: The four-dimension taxonomy proposed by (Hansman & Hunt, 2005)
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Appendix B: Attack Vectors in ICS
Attack Vector
Virus

“Self-replicating program that propagates through some form of
infected files”, (Hansman & Hunt, 2005)

Worms

“self-replicating program that propagates without using infected
files; (Usually propagate through network services on computers
or through email.)” (Hansman & Hunt, 2005)

Trojans:

“a program made to appear benign that
serves some malicious purpose”, (Hansman & Hunt, 2005)

Buffer overflows:

“a process that gains control or crashes another process by
overflowing the other process’s buffer”, (Hansman & Hunt, 2005)

Denial of service

“an attack which prevents legitimate users from accessing or

attacks:

using a host or network”, (Hansman & Hunt, 2005)

Network attacks:

“attacks focused on attacking a network or the users on the
network by manipulating network protocols, ranging from the
data-link layer to the application layer”, (Hansman & Hunt, 2005)

Physical attacks:

“attacks based on damaging physical components of a network or
computer”, (Hansman & Hunt, 2005)

Password
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“attacks aimed at gaining a password”, (Hansman & Hunt, 2005)

attacks:
Information

“attacks in which no physical or digital damage is carried out and

gathering attacks:

no subversion occurs, but in which important information is
gained by the attacker, possibly to be used in a further attack”,
(Hansman & Hunt, 2005)

Malware

Malicious programs scripted by attackers to carry out malicious
activities on victims

Phishing

Emails or other forms of communications used to spoof
unassuming victims in order to gain access into their networks.

Logic bombs

Malicious programs designed to execute a task after a delay.

Spyware

Malicious software designed to stealthily exfil data from a victim
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Appendix C: Vulnerabilities in ICS
Vulnerability
Vulnerability in

The design of the system is secure, but the implementation

implementation

fails to meet the design and thus vulnerabilities are
introduced. Buffer overflows often exploit such vulnerabilities,
for example a program may be designed securely, but its
implementation contains bugs that can be exploited. Also
zero-day-vulnerabilities and vulnerabilities in hardware would
be considered under implementation.

Vulnerability in

The fundamental design of the system is flawed, so that even

design

a perfect implementation will have vulnerabilities. For
example, a system which allows users to choose weak
passwords will have a vulnerability in its design.

Vulnerability in

The configuration of the system introduces vulnerabilities.

configuration

The system itself may be secure but if configured incorrectly,
renders itself vulnerable.
An example would be installing a secured operating system
and then opening a number of vulnerable ports.
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Appendix D: Attacker Profiles in ICS
Attacker Profile
Nation State

These attackers are sophisticated and well-funded. They
can be described as to be engaged in cyberwarfare. Their
goals are multifaceted. They try to create incidents to
disgruntle citizens of a country. They also try to conduct
espionage and sabotage against. Propaganda.

Hacktivist

Hacktivists can be motivated many different reasons. Their
primary goal is to send a message or take revenge.

Hackers

Hackers are diverse. More specifically known as Blackhat
hackers have mal-intentions and are usually financially
motivated. They conduct their operations primarily for a
monetary gain.

Insider

Disgruntled employees are usually the what fits this category.
They use their insider knowledge to intrude in their own
company and cause damage or conduct unauthorized
activities.

